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Microserendipity in Creative Process
The puzzle facing those who research creativity is how to pinpoint the genesis of a 
new idea. Traditional cognitivist approaches have implicitly assumed a linear process with an 
internal locus of idea generation which proceeds and directs engagement with materials 
(Glăveanu, 2014; Ingold, 2009). This reflects a wider research tendency which loads the 
responsibility for creativity on the individual person and seeks the answer to great creativity 
in the mind of a creative genius (Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2018). Despite notable 
exceptions and objections (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Glaveanu, 2014; Montuori & Purser, 
1995; Sawyer, 2010) to this framework, laboratory based investigations into how new 
thoughts are formed tend to make the assumption that the focus of study should be the 
internal mechanisms and individual psychometric properties undergirding creativity. In this 
way, studies of eminent creators focus on their biographical details (see for example, Steptoe, 
1998) and laboratory-based studies of creative cognition focus on participants’ responses to 
problems designed to elucidate internal cognitive processes. Thus, participants may be 
presented with an insight problem—that is a problem which is not amenable to strategic 
processing but is rather solved by an abductive leap—and their success rate calculated and 
latency to solution recorded. These tasks are presented in such a way as to require and 
therefore isolate mainly mental processes (such as a riddle or a pictorial representation of a 
problem, see Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). 
This paper will argue that this classical view of how creativity unfolds does not fully 
reflect qualitative reports of creativity whether in the lab or the artist’s atelier where the 
internal genesis of a creative thought cannot be separated from its external expression. These 
qualitative studies describe a dynamic and situated process; a framework of creativity that 
extends the unit of analysis beyond a purely internal view is necessary to fully incorporate 
this evidence from different theoretical and empirical perspectives. Ignoring how participants 
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may recruit and exploit external physical resources in thinking not only prevents researchers 
from mapping the physical traces of the genesis of a new idea (Vallee-Tourangeau & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2020) but also necessarily excludes those moments when the material is a 
constitutive part of that process. In this paper we argue that the role of unplanned accidents 
has been under researched and propose the relational concept of serendipity to support the 
explanation of how creativity emerges from the interaction of external accidents and internal 
psychometric properties. We first proceed by reviewing ideas and evidence that underscore 
the importance of materiality in creativity. Taking material engagement as the vantage point 
of a perspective on creativity casts agency and accidents in a challenging light; challenging in 
that materiality invites a distributed definition of agency and at the same time elevates the 
ontological status of accidents not as anecdotal events that favour a prepared mind—to 
paraphrase the oft-quoted Pasteurian aphorism—but as the inevitable consequence of creative 
agents physically manipulating the world qua thinking or creating. We then proceed to 
contrast more sharply the concept of ‘luck’ and the notion of ‘serendipity’; the later requires 
an enacted coupling with the physical environment. We are then in a position to define and 
illustrate the concept of ‘microserendipity’ more rigorously, and in the process outline 
methodological recommendations to help researchers better understand this phenomenon in 
the genesis of creative thought.
Creative Material Engagement
It is not surprising that when the research focus is on the individual properties that 
generate a creative product, then it provides strong evidence for the role of these traits. 
Methodologies are not epistemologically neutral (Vallée‐Tourangeau & March, 2019). 
However, if we move beyond laboratory based studies of creativity and assess the rich 
empirical data from semi-structured interviews or case studies, these provide supporting 
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evidence for a model in which the material environment is not accepted as a passive scaffold 
for creativity but actively shapes the process (Malafouris, 2020).
For instance, the work of Glăveanu et al. (2013) challenges this person-centred notion 
of creative agency across broad range of creative domains: artists, designers, science, writers 
and musicians. What emerges from the results of their series of interviews is a collaborative 
tension between human and material agency. The artists interviewed suggest that “objects 
resist the intentions of the artist. All of a sudden, objects ‘ask a question’ and very often 
‘change the original plan,’ being ‘stronger’ than the creator, ‘imposing their rules’.” (p. 5). 
Designers spoke of a collaborative relationship with the materials “from the need to explore 
materials, to ‘test their limits’, to the frustrations one experiences when not ‘feeling’ the 
fabric” (p. 7). Even the chemist (not a domain traditionally associated with material play) 
described their creative process in terms of a “game with matter” (p. 8). 
Similar descriptions of material agency arise in the description of an artist arranging 
photos in Sjöholm (2014), where the final work is described as “a hybrid of the artist and the 
physicalities of the collected” (p. 510). The artist further “explains how the photos were 
asking to be categorized in a different way” (p. 509). Equally, the qualitative work 
undertaken by Glăveanu (2012) on the decoration of Romanian Easter eggs indicates that 
creativity is distributed between the maker and the material affordances of the eggs 
themselves where the affordances are initially ‘unperceived’ but will go on to shape the final 
product once noticed. This engagement with the material can cause uncertainty and it is this 
uncertainty which may spark the genesis of the idea (Bardt, 2019; Beghetto, 2020).
Such results foreground the importance of the material in creativity and invite a more 
nuanced characterisation of agency than traditional linear models (Malafouris, 2014). 
Although there have been several calls to recentre the material in our understanding of human 
behaviour and cognition (Barad, 2003; Orlikowski, 2007), it is perhaps particularly surprising 
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that the relationships with the material is under emphasised in creativity research (Tanggaard 
& Beghetto, 2015) where there is a necessary entanglement with material; to create is to 
produce something concrete, the ephemerality of a novel thought moves from imagination to 
creativity when it is enacted and not before. We align ourselves with those researchers who 
suggest that creative processes are constituted not by internal computations over mental 
representations of the artist’s materials but through and by those materials (see also Bardt, 
2019; March, 2019; Glăveanu, 2020; Wheeler, 2018). This is not to suggest that internal 
processes are erased but rather that they are manifest through the act of creating and it is this 
act which is necessarily engaged with material. 
This material engagement is what Malafouris (2020) calls ‘thinging’: “things actively 
participate in human cognitive life” (p. 2). In the case of creativity, he argues that creative 
agency cannot be reduced to one or other part of the relationship between the maker and the 
material, rather it arises from the dance between the two; in other words, it is irreducible to 
either a mental or physical cause. Malafouris supported his ideas with detailed qualitative 
observations of the potter at the wheel to illustrate how observing the process of making 
collapses an artificial distinction between imagination and formation. Detailed qualitative 
observational data such as this allows us to enhance our understanding of complex creative 
processes and draw out more elusive mechanisms. 
If we expand the creative ecosystem to encompass the objects and people who play an 
active role in the creative process, then we move from a linear, staged theory of creativity in 
which an internal plan is imposed on inert matter and the final product is what matters—
hylomorphism as per Ingold (2009)—to a looping and reciprocal process from which agency 
emerges. Such a model suggests that what is produced cannot be explained by a reductive 
process that focuses on only the properties of one or the other, but rather must take into 
account the manner in which a creative moment emerges from their interaction. This 
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dynamic, action-based account of creativity invites tracking the smaller, micro moments that 
arise in the sometimes-mundane practice of artistic creation (Beghetto, 2009; Tanggaard & 
Beghetto, 2013).
The Role of Accidents
When material objects are considered active agents in the creative process, it is often 
done so with a discussion of their affordances for action. We follow Chemero (2011) who 
argues that affordances are not static properties of an object but instead emerge through 
interaction and cannot be reduced to either of the two agents; rather they are relational 
(Glăveanu, 2020). How this interaction unfolds is necessarily complex. However, in the 
following sections, we show that accidents arising from the unplanned actions explain some 
of that complexity. This is not intended as a comprehensive explanation of all creative 
mechanisms, but rather a suggestion to expand the theoretical register. 
Video recordings of participants engaged in a problem-solving task allow us to trace 
this shifting agency as it unfolds on a microscale. Consider Steffensen et al. (2016) who 
undertook a frame by frame analysis of an insight problem solver in a materially rich 
environment. The original study invited participants to place 17 animals in four enclosures 
such that there is an odd number in each enclosure. The solution to this difficult problem 
requires abandoning the direct application of an arithmetic solution––no four odd numbers 
can add to 17––and creating overlapping pens. In their detailed analysis of a single problem 
solver who worked on building a physical model of the solution (with pipe cleaners and 
animal figurines), the authors show that the pivotal change in the problem solving trajectory 
arose from an accidental overlap of the enclosures (the chenille material of the pipe cleaners 
crocheted one enclosure onto another). An accidental move and change in the environment 
offered and interesting interim configuration which was then distilled by the participant into a 
solution. This observational data suggest an important place for the role of accident in 
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problem solving, captured in laboratory conditions while participants engaged in first order 
problem solving, that is when they think through and with a physical model of the problem 
(Vallée-Tourangeau & March, 2019). It is thus possible to document the role of accidents in 
the origins of new ideas under laboratory conditions.
Outside the laboratory, qualitative ethnographic accounts of creative cognition are 
replete with accidents. Sjöholm (2014) casts accidents as a mechanism through which the 
photographs disrupt the artists’ creative plan: “the photos kept on being uncontrollable in the 
sense that they kept on falling down to the floor” (p.509). For the artists interviewed by 
Glăveanu et al. (2013) “accidents enrich the project and one needs to constantly be on the 
alert for them’ (p. 5) for designers ‘creative activity is a game […] of ‘happy’ accidents” (p. 
7), for scientists: “there is in science room for accidents and surprises” (p. 8) and for 
musicians: “accidents play also a role in this process, and they are ‘artistically interesting to 
have’” (p. 11). The role of accidents in the creative process was also emphasised as a key 
emergent theme by Sawyer (2018) in his qualitative work on the creative processes of MFA 
students: “artists described a moment in their creative process when an unexpected accident, 
originating in the external environment, contributed to their creative process.” (p. 134). 
The role of accident in the creative process is explicitly considered by Piñeyro (2019) 
when she explores the process of creating polymeric coiled actuators, a form of nylon coil to 
incorporate into woven and knitted textiles. An accident during the creative process––too 
much weight applied to the lower end of the coil––created a new structure and facilitated new 
understanding of the kinetic potential of the material. The accident led to changes on both a 
local scale within the nylon coil itself and also on a more global scale as it elicited change in 
the whole research project: “the accidental event influenced the methods subsequently used in 
the research” (p. 1879). 
The Problematic Role of Luck
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It would be disingenuous to suggest that the role of luck generally is ignored in 
creativity research. Indeed, it is often explicitly cited as important to the creative process 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Simonton, 2004). However, luck in these accounts tends to be 
conceived of as a lifelong factor. Simonton’s (2004) research on creativity in science focuses 
on chance not just in the generation of new ideas but also in how chance functions in all 
aspects of the new ideas being realised from peer review to grant funding with the statement 
that the “the chance account accommodates more fully the immense complexity of scientific 
creativity” (p. 163). In this way, we make a distinction between broader stories of luck in 
personal narrative and smaller microgenetic moments at the moment of material engagement 
which we call accidents. When artists refer to accidents, they also mean the smaller moments 
of tension and rupture that shape particular moments in the creative process, like the 
accidents described by the creative professionals interviewed above. Thus, luck is 
heteroscalar: that is, it has an influence on multiple time scales. Of these, the micro scale is 
often referenced in passing but remains under investigated. 
Of course, all types of luck from accident to fortunate coincidences are problematic in 
the case of creativity. Creativity in the research literature and in popular understanding has 
acquired the status of an epistemic and character virtue (Kieran, 2017; Weisberg, 2015) 
whether that be a virtue associated with a unique talent or with the level of perseverance and 
hard work. If creativity is considered a virtue, then it must be agential and not overly 
dependent on chance. Weisberg is particularly dismissive of accidents in creativity. He 
repeatedly (e.g., 2006, 2010, 2015) caricatures accidents in creativity with the following 
story: “Let us say that I am a painter, and one day I accidentally spill paint on a canvas, 
which leaves a stain on my partially finished work, making it unusable. Let us further assume 
that I am visited by the director of a museum, who sees my stained canvas, loves it, and 
purchases it for display in the museum. The painting is then discussed in art books, and other 
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artists use my spilled work as the basis for innovations of their own. My piece of junk has 
thus become part of the world of art. Was I creative in producing that painting? No (…)” 
(2006, p. 60, emphasis added). Weisberg also juxtaposes this story with a schizophrenic’s 
“word salad” (2010, p. 237): While the canvas with spilled paint and the psychotic word 
salad can be novel, neither can be deemed creative because of their unintentional origin. 
Intentionality is a key feature of Weisberg’s definition of creativity. To be sure, accidents 
problematize agency and intentionality in creativity. Weisberg (2015, p. 121) goes on: “(…) 
it is possible to obtain objective evidence for the intentionality of some action. Suppose that 
one was observing the artist who knocked over that can of paint. If she said ‘‘Oops!’’ as the 
can went over, one would have evidence for a lack of intentionality in the action.” But the 
artist might have said “Aha” rather than “Oops”, and it is these micro moments of ‘insight’ or 
possibly ‘outsight’ (Vallée-Tourangeau & March, 2019) that can pave the trajectory of a 
creative product. It is Weisberg’s implicit commitment to an internalist model of creativity 
that endows his spilled paint anecdote the force he believes it conveys. A transactional 
perspective on creativity, however, shreds Weisberg’s anecdote of much of its rhetorical 
value. 
However, there is an underlying anxiety expressed here that recurs across the 
literature. Bardt (2019, p. 91) expresses the same fear: “At its worst, chance is an inauthentic, 
unearned creativity”. It is clear that to suggest that accident plays a part in creativity does 
appear to undermine the very real need for talent and training which is integral to the artistic 
process (Blackburn, 2017). The challenge then is to incorporate the very real reports of 
accident into the model of creativity without risking creativity becoming perceived as a 
stochastic process, landing at random. Rather than viewing accident only through the 
framework of non-agentic chance (Coffman, 2009), this paper suggests that the framework of 
serendipity can elucidate the balance between unplanned environmentally generated actions 
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and personal agency and talent. On this view, creative intentionality and agency emerge 
through enacted luck. 
From Luck to Serendipity
Since Walpole (1754; Merton & Barber, 2004) coined the word serendipity there has 
been debate over the exact meaning and different writers and domains have explored 
different aspects of the word (Napolitano, 2013). Simply put, serendipity arises when there is 
a combination of accident and sagacity, occurring “at the intersection of chance and wisdom” 
(Copeland, 2019, p. 2385), and therefore it cannot be understood without reference to both 
chance and wisdom. Wisdom here is best understood not as a psychometric property that can 
be profiled1, but rather as describing the process of enacting the luck which is constantly 
generated by an environment in flux. Serendipity occurs through action. In this way, 
serendipity properly understood collapses the distinction between luck and wisdom: 
serendipitous wisdom arises when luck is enacted. This echoes Piñeyro’s recognition that her 
attitude towards the accident and her “intuitive, improvisational and open-ended” method of 
working (p. 1880) represented a sagacity that reflects broader creative practice and play (see 
also Austin’s [1979] notion of ‘altamirage’). Whereas a narrative based around artistic talent 
places agency in the artist and one based around luck places agency in the environment, 
serendipity suggests that agency and creative intention arises in the relationship between the 
two. 
In addition to the relational aspect, serendipity has a contingent aspect. While luck 
must be enacted to become serendipity, the same combination of accident and sagacity is not 
always sufficient to guarantee these moments. Rather, there is a vexing temporal 
contingency. This leads to a complex phenomenon, yet one which deserves further 
unpacking. It is important to note, for instance, that in the case of the controlled and detailed 
1 Indeed, attempts to do have led to frustrating results; see McCay-Peet, Toms, and Kelloway (2015). 
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observations of the 17A participant in Steffensen et al. (described above), accidental overlaps 
occurred previous to the event trigger, and so failed to be enacted. These moments of ‘missed 
serendipity’ occurred with the same person in the same environment, but there was a singular 
moment in which the individual was able to exploit the environmental affordances offered by 
the accident. Serendipity here was the property of the moment rather than only the person and 
situation. This contingency on a temporal moment reflects its emergent nature. These factors 
make a predictive research programme more problematic. However, the lack of predictability 
is not a strong enough reason to ignore its existence, nor does it undermine its importance in 
unveiling its role in the creative process. When dealing with something as complex and 
singular as creativity, it is perhaps important to bear in mind that non predictive explanations 
of singular events hold equal validity (Robinson, 2011; Sutton, 2010). 
As a young research field, there have been several models proposed to explain the 
process of serendipity. What is remarkable about these models is their similarity in form to 
models of insight problem solving (e.g., Danek, 2018): They posit a change in the internal 
disposition of the problem solver often accompanied by a phenomenological marker, which is 
indistinguishable from the ‘aha’ moment in insight research. This points to an already close 
although under explored relationship between serendipity and current models of insight. 
Makri and Blandford (2012) suggest that to make the connection, a necessary part of their 
model of serendipity, requires a moment of ‘insight’. Later Makri argues that the shift in 
thinking observed in serendipity where the external world becomes a catalyst for change and 
forces new connections which could not possibly be anticipated is the same as the shift in 
thinking observed in innovation and creativity (Race & Makri, 2016). In the model Race and 
Makri propose, serendipity is responsible for innovation in part because it forces a changes in 
the course of action. McCay-Peet and Toms (2015) describe serendipity ‘triggers’ which 
could easily be recast as the ‘hints’ that have been seen to facilitate insight problem solving 
Page 11 of 30 The Journal of Creative Behavior
11
(Ball & Litchfield, 2013). When Foster and Ford (2003, p. 330) write of serendipity “taking 
the researcher in a new direction, in which the problem conception or solution is reconfigured 
in some way”, there are palpable echoes of the restructuring theory that accompanies models 
of insight (Ohlsson, 1992). 
The main difference between the two is that insight problem solving has traditionally 
been cast as a purely internal process (although see Vallée-Tourangeau, [2014] for a critique 
of this research programme) whereas there has always been a necessary emphasis in the 
serendipity literature on a bidirectional, materially engaged aspect of serendipity that reflects 
its emmeshed nature. So, in contrast to insight research where restructuring is theorised as 
coming about through unconscious semantic inferences that link hitherto unrelated elements 
in the mind of the problem solver (Ohlsson, 1992), the links and restructuring in serendipity 
research is driven by chance and accidents arising in the environment. In this way, it is closer 
in form to insight generated through material manipulation (Vallée‐Tourangeau et al., 2016) 
or data driven restructuring (Fleck & Weisberg, 2013), both of which open up a space for the 
external world in the creative ecosystem. 
In summary, qualitative accounts of creativity challenge the dominant drive in 
research on creativity in two important ways: They centre material agency and consequently 
naturally invite reflections on the role of accident in the creativity. The presence of small 
moments of luck arising from unplanned changes in the material environment, rather than 
life-long career-based luck, remain under researched. In part, they are problematic because 
they undermine creative intentionality, however by recasting these accidents as relational 
serendipity we can explore how creativity emerges from an interaction between the person, 
the material and the moment. 
Microserendipity
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However, just as with creativity, our understanding of serendipity does not precede 
methodological considerations. Serendipity is identified after it has occurred, sometimes even 
after a significant amount of time has elapsed (Foster & Ellis, 2014). Data are gathered in two 
main ways: either semi-structured interviews (Erdelez et al., 2016; Makri & Blandford, 2012; 
McCay-Peet & Toms, 2015) or collections of reports of serendipity in either the first or third 
person (Van Andel, 1994; Yaqub, 2018). If serendipity is researched using retrospective 
narratives, then the person’s understanding of serendipity is centred and directs our own 
understanding of it (cf. Glaveanu et al. [2011] on creativity). Methodologies are never 
epistemically neutral and so researching in this way results in a self-reinforcing 
methodological circle (Danziger, 1985). 
It is clear from the qualitative research on creativity that serendipitous moments occur 
on multiple time scales and with different effects, and that materially generated serendipity is 
viewed as integral to the creative process across the spectrum of creativity from so-called 
‘insight’ problems as investigated by cognitive psychologists (Steffensen et al., 2016) to 
creativity as manifested in the creation of large sculptural installations (March, 2019). Such 
moments are often missed in studies which focus on either the creative product or the creative 
process over a coarsely grained time scale and through a narrative lens which centres human 
experience and agency (often a secondary consequence of the language employed to narrate 
the creative arc of a work of art; Vallée-Tourangeau & March, 2019). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Rubin et al.’s (2011) model (see Figure 1) generated from their analysis of blog posts 
suggests that serendipity has three facets: a prepared mind, an act of noticing, and chance. 
These relate to the personal qualities, the process of turning luck into serendipity, and 
environmental affordances. Luck in their model is experienced as a “perceived lack of 
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control”. This echoes the phenomenological description of creatives cited above who report 
loss of agency when engaging with the material world. 
Note that in the model above, chance is not isolated in occasioning the fortuitous 
outcome. The environment creates lots of opportunities for chance, but that chance is inert 
until a person acts upon it. As we can see Facet B – the act of noticing - explicitly links the 
prepared mind and the accident in the environment. This is a contingent moment which is not 
guaranteed (Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2020; under review) and it may be that a closer 
attention to the nature of the act would reveal more about the nature of the prepared mind. 
For instance, it appears that increased attention to irrelevant objects in the environment 
predict creative outcomes (Agnoli et al, 2016) and a state of actionable uncertainty (Beghetto, 
2020) may increase the likelihood of looking for resolution outside an internal cognitive 
ecosystem. Additionally, Thrash and Elliot’s  (2004) detailed psychometric mapping of the 
traits that relate to inspirational triggers (among which we may count accidents) suggest that 
the trait of receptive engagement may be strongly related to the feeling of inspiration. 
However, such explanations require us to take the engagement with materials seriously. 
Serendipity is something that emerges in action. For those who are concerned that 
allowing accident a causal role (no matter how small) in creativity somehow threatens it 
(Weisberg, 2015) or undermines its status as a virtue, a model that requires the accident to be 
enacted should act as a form of reassurance. Alongside, the environmental opportunities, 
serendipity is dependent on both a person’s actions and state: the act of a person noticing it, 
which is also dependent on the state of being prepared. The combination of intentional action 
triggered by accidents in the environment offers a powerful and wider explanatory model for 
engaged creativity. Neither individual nor environment are privileged in this model, rather 
their interaction and the distributed nature of artistic agency is what drives the emergent 
creative product. Serendipity is thus emergent and distributed. 
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We term microserendipity, the small moments of serendipity that occur over a 
controlled time span and are revealed through finer-grained observational methods (such as 
Kinenoetic Analysis as described in Ross & Vallée-Tourangeau, in preparation). They may 
be trivial, or pivotal to the final product, but they form an important part of the process. These 
micromoments of a creative trajectory deserve recognition and mapping (Tanggard & 
Beghetto, 2013). These are similar in nature to moments described by the same term in 
Bogers and Björneborn (2013). The difference in the understanding of microserendipity 
proposed here is not the scale of the serendipitous moments but rather the nature of the 
evidence being collected. Bogers and Björneborn collected reports of serendipitous moments 
via Twitter. The main distinction between the moments is a methodological one—the 
moments identified by Bogers and Björneborn are reliant on self-reports, we suggest that we 
can observe those moments. This does also have ontological implications for serendipity and 
re-positions it as something than has an existence beyond the understanding of the person 
who experiences it Such moments have been relatively ignored by research in both creativity 
and serendipity, but the indirect evidence cited above indicates that they have an important 
role to play in the creative process. 
Towards Developing a Programme of Research in Microserendipity 
It is in many ways not surprising that serendipity remains under-investigated despite 
being often referenced in passing. It is a “slippery” (Makri & Blandford, 2012, p. 684) and 
contingent concept which arises from an unplanned interaction between person and 
environment and will therefore be inconsistent and complex. Subjecting such a phenomenon 
to a systematic empirical investigation is fraught with difficulty. However, it is mentioned 
with sufficient frequency in the creativity literature to warrant taking the time to assess its 
importance in the creative process. Complexity should not deter efforts to better understand a 
phenomenon; rather, it should catalyse them. 
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The methodology outlined below assumes a commitment to creativity not as a 
psychological trait but as an action which arises from engagement with a material and can 
therefore be evidenced through actions and material traces. Such a moment cannot be reliably 
elicited in the lab nor narrated in retrospect. It is unclear to what extent it is related to 
personality traits. In our view, microserendipity is a singular, enacted event. We suggest the 
use of video material to track in detail the creative process (similar to the methods outlined in 
Tanggaard & Beghetto, 2015) with at times a frame by frame analysis to pinpoint the shifts in 
a creative ecosystem (Schubert, 2013). This research could be done across larger data sets, 
which would allow the frequency of occurrence to be understood and mapped. This is similar 
in nature to the work and methods outlined in Glăveanu and Lahlou (2012) who describe the 
use of Subjective Evidence-Based Ethnography (Lahlou, 2011) to track participants’ actions as 
well as thoughts. Such a method would isolate moments of accident. Equally, when it comes 
to an idiosyncratic artistic process. it would be possible to use this detailed analysis to track 
moment of serendipity within the trajectory of creativity. A focused ethnography (Knoblauch 
et al., 2013) of this type would allows moments of broader serendipity to be reconciled with 
smaller moments of accident to disentangle their role in turning material into art. 
For example, participants in Ross and Vallée-Tourangeau (2020) were filmed as they 
interacted with 7 letter tiles in a Scrabble-like task: They were given 5 minutes to generate as 
many words of 3 or more letters and were invited to move the tiles to help them discover new 
words. Performance in this task environment is determined by the participants’ verbal fluency 
as well as the degree to which they engage with the environment, that is the proportion of 
time they interact with the tiles. The physical reification of new words in this manner is 
sometimes the product of strategic movements, but a finer-grained analysis of actions, letter 
configurations and word recognition reveals moments of microserendipity: When 
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environmentally generated chance yields a word that is recognized by the participants. This 
recognition triggers new moves that enact a change in the pathway to the problem solution. 
Ross and Vallée-Tourangeau (under review) employed a mixed method procedure to 
explore anagram solving: Participants were invited to solve 5-letter anagrams with movable 
letter tiles. They were recorded in an observation lab (equipped with overhead cameras, see 
Figure 2). Performance was assessed in conditions where participants could shuffle the tiles, 
but not rearrange individual letters or could shuffle and move the tiles as they saw fit. 
Aggregate performance measures were calculated, supplemented with detailed coding of the 
video evidence. Anagrams provide a convenient platform for the study of luck in an 
interactive environment where letter tiles can be physically moved. Shuffling the letter tiles 
can yield the problem solution or at least steps toward it. The difficulty of an anagram 
depends to some extent on distractor bigrams, so shuffling may be crucial for breaking 
mental set. In addition, letter tiles are easily traceable and identifiable and their movements 
can be mapped, physically, unveiling the letter configurations that result in solutions, or 
equally important, that mislead participants. From an observer’s perspective, these physical 
traces also revealed missed moments of serendipity. Thus, the procedure offers a unique 
opportunity to assess the role of luck and serendipity in problem solving.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The granular coding of the video evidence revealed several moments of 
microserendipity, that is when moves by the problem solver trigger unexpected 
configurations in the array which are then noticed and used to direct the problem-solving 
trajectory. For example, one participant working on the LYMIK anagram, first spells out the 
word MILK and once this is formed, she notices the left-over Y and uses it to create the 
solution, MILKY. Her voice rises in pitch in excitement and the move which attaches the Y is 
faster than the previous slightly laboured spelling out. The solution is triggered by a change 
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in the array rather than a preformed plan. Ross and Vallée-Tourangeau provide other 
examples of event pivots triggered by an unplanned change in the array.
Such moment of microserendipity can only be captured through a fine-grained analysis 
of video recording of a participant engaging in problem solving with a physical model of the 
problem (see the detailed movement by movement analysis reported in Ross & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2020; under review). Laboratory research on microserendipity is predicated on a 
methodological shift from second order problem solving which disconnects the problem 
solver from her environment, to one that situates the problem solver in a materially rich 
environment (Vallée‐Tourangeau & March, 2019). It also requires a shift from a focus on 
aggregate performance measures to the process of problem solving and invention. A more 
idiographic approach through mixed methods will allow us to document the role of 
microserendipity in laboratory-based experiments as well as ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995). 
Importantly, by characterising microserendipity as requiring both environmental and personal 
factors, we can assess the relative contributions of each, and how these interact. 
This further constitutes a methodological shift for the study of serendipity from the 
retrospective description of a phenomenon - currently the dominant methodology of 
serendipity research - to one that can be observed and categorised independently. This is not 
to suggest that a third person account is necessarily more reliable (indeed, one of us has 
argued elsewhere for the opposite [Vallée-Tourangeau & March, 2019]) but rather that there 
is currently a dearth of such accounts in the serendipity literature. A combination of both 
personal reflections and third person observations will likely broaden research horizons and 
seed theoretical developments. It will further allow us to track the moments when 
serendipitous affordances in the environment are not exploited through choice but through a 
form of inattentional blindness (Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
Conclusion
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The role of luck has been a constant yet unexamined refrain in the literature around 
creativity. While people have examined the luck over the longer time scale of artistic careers 
and output, there has been little systematic examination of the role of accidents in creativity. 
This is despite evidence from qualitative data that accidents do in fact frequently play a role 
in artistic creativity. Luck is, however, by its very nature unpredictable and arbitrary. More 
suitable to a programme of creative cognition is a framework that accounts for how random 
environmental affordances and accidents become part of an ecosystem which incorporates 
both luck and the person or more properly, that is, a framework of serendipity. 
The importance of serendipity to discovery and innovation is clear (Foster & Ford, 
2003). Large corporations such as Dreamworks are actively trying to promote serendipitous 
encounters (Cunha, Clegg, & Mendonça, 2010; but see also Olma, 2016, wherein he assesses 
the value of such corporate level serendipity and the inherent dangers in structuring for 
serendipity). Furthermore, there is a strong thread in the serendipity research literature of 
looking at the environmental aspects of serendipity that would be useful as a complement to 
both the insight literature and theorising on ‘real world’ artistic creativity. While serendipity 
itself is dependent on accident and chance, subtle shifts in the environment alongside certain 
personal characteristics may foster serendipity (Björneborn, 2017; McCay-Peet, Toms, & 
Kelloway, 2015). 
Our understanding of the ontology of both creativity and of serendipity is influenced by 
the methodologies we use to investigate them. This hampers the understanding of both. We 
propose that third-person observations of moments of microserendipity will extend our 
understanding of the role of luck and accident in the creative process and, consequently, their 
importance to the final product. It will also allow us to catalogue when people do not notice 
chance as it arises in the environment. Missed serendipity on this scale (unlike say the longer 
time scale identified in Barber & Fox, 1958) would be impossible to identify from 
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retrospective narratives. This methodological shift is not proposed with the aim to replace 
other aspects of analysis nor provide an exhaustive explanation of what is a necessarily 
complex action and process, but rather to support our understanding of how creative thinking 
and acting proceeds in a complex and situated world, and to begin to disentangle the balance 
between accident and human agency in creativity.
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